RECENT CASES.
BAILEE-The contribuBAILMIENT-IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE-GRATUITOUS
tory negligence of a gratuitous bailee cannot be imputed to the bailor to
prevent recovery against a third negligent party, through whose negligence
concurring with that of the bailee the goods were injured. Spelman v. Delano,
163 S. W. Rep. 300 (Mo. 1914).
The bailor has a right of action for permanent injury done to the bailment due to negligence of a third person, independently of any action on
the part of the bailee. White v. Griffin, 49 N. Car. 139 (1856); Rindge v.
Coleraine, Yi Gray, 157 (Mass. 1858). Negligence of third parties concurring with that of defendant in producing the injury cannot be pleaded in
defense of an action by the injured party who was not negligent. Mott
v. Hudson River Co., 8 Bosw. .345 (N. Y. i86i) ; Atkinson v. Goodrich TransOn the strength of these two undisportation Co., 6o Wis. 141 (884).
puted principles, courts have held almost uniformly that the contributory
negligence of the bailee for hire cannot be imputed to the innocent bailor in
an action for injury to the bailment. Gibson v. Bessemer & L. E. Ry. Co.,
37 Pa. Super. Ct. 70 (19o8); Chicago Transit Co. v. Leach, 117 Ill. App. 169
(igo5). The whole subject is carefully considered in N. J. Electric Ry. Co.
v. N. Y. Ry. Co., 61 N. J. L. 287 (1897). It has been held, however, that the
negligence of the bailee is bar to an action by the bailor against the defendant
whose negligence concurred in producing the damage to the bailed goods.
1n genSvea Insurance Co. v. Vicksburg Ry. Co., 153 Fed. Rep. 774 (1907).
eral, the contributory negligence of the bailee is no bar to an action by
the bailor, nor does the negligence of the bailee causing injury to third
persons, give those third persons a right of action against the bailor. ConWhere, however,
nor v. Penna. R. R. Co., 24 Pa. Super. Ct. 246 (19o4).
the bailor remains in control of the bailed property by the hiring of one
of his servants to a third party in control of the property, the general rule
applies that the negligence of the servant is imputed to the master. Johnston v. Atchison Ry. Co., 117 Mo. App. 308 (19o6).
While it is very generally held that the negligence of the bailee for hire
is not imputable to the bailor, there is greater doubt as to the gratuitous
bailee. Struck by the fact that the bailor may bring trespass for damages to
his bailment in cases of gratuitous bailment and the close relation between
the bailor and bailee, the bailee has been considered as almost a servant of
the bailee and the negligence of the bailee has been imputed to the bailor.
Illinois Central Ry. Co. v. Sims, 77 Miss. 325 (1899); Welty v. Indianapolis R. R. Co., 1o5 Ind. 55 (1885). While in the former case the bailee
was in fact a gratuitous bailee, the court expressed its opinion that the same
rule would apply to all bailments. In Pennsylvania, there is a case that has
never been overruled or cited for the point of imputed negligence, which
holds the gratuitous bailor liable for the negligence of the bailee. Forks
Township v. King, 84 Pa. 230 (1877). A recent case has held that the master is
not liable for the negligence of the chauffeur who has taken the car for
purposes of his own. Sarver v. Mitchell, 35 Pa. Super. Ct. 69 (19o7).
Although the machine was in this case taken without the consent of the
master, a case was cited with approval which states that if the servant uses
for his own purposes, but with the assent of the master, goods of the master,
the master is not liable for the negligence of the servant while the servant
is in the role of gratuitous bailee. Bard v. Yohn, 26 Pa. 482 (1856). Where
the servant has become bailee for hire, the negligence is not imputable to
the master and he can recover for injury to the bailment. Currie v. Consolidated R. R., 81 Conn. 383 (1908).
Biu.s AND NOTES-ACCEPTANCE-When a bill of exchange was presented
for acceptance, the drawee wrote to the holder as follows: "I return the
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order. The balance of his account is the same, but I do not know if the
hands have been paid and will have to wait until thirty days are up." Held:
This is no acceptance under the Negotiable Instruments Act (Wash. Laws
of 1899, c. 149, §132). Plaza, etc., Co. v. Ryan, 138 Pac. Rep. 65i (Wash.
1914).
At the law merchant, the acceptance of a bill of exchange had to be
according to the tenor of the bill. Boehm v. Garcias, i Camp. 425 (Eng.
18o6). Partial and conditional acceptances were allowed though the holder
who presented the bill might refuse such acceptance and protest it for dishonor. Petit v. Benson, Comberbach, 452 (Eng. 1697); Smith v. Abbott,
2 Strange, 1152 (Eng. 1741).

The acceptance did not have to be in writing

nor on the bill. Thus a mere oral promise to pay, Tumley v. Palmer, 2
Strange, iooo (Eng. 1734); Spaulding v. Andrews, 48 Pa. 411 (1864), or a
promise to pay contained in a separate instrument was good as an acceptance. Powell v. Monnier, i Alkyus, 611 (Eng. 1737); Wynne v. Raikes, 5
East, 574 (18o4). Likewise the mere word "accepted," though unsigned, was
enough. Defaur v. Oxenden, i M. & R. go (Eng. 1831). However, the word
of acceptance, whether oral or in writing, had to be unequivocal. Walker v.
Tide, i Rich. 249 (S.C. 1845). Thus it was not enough to constitute an
acceptance that the drawee said: "There is your bill; it is all right." Powell
v. Jones, i Esp. 17 (Eng. 1793); or "The bill will be taken up when due."
Sayer v. Kitchen, i Esp. 2o9 (Eng. 1795), or that the drawer receipted the
amount of the bill on the back of it. Bassett v. Haines, 9 Cal. 26o (1858).
Under the Negotiable Instruments Act, Pa. 19Ol, P. L. 194, §123, an
acceptance is defined as "the signification by the drawee of his assent to the
order of the drawer." It is clear that in the principal case there was no assent
to the drawer's order.
CONTRACTS-ILLEGAL

OBjEcT-One

who kept a house of prostitution

bought furniture, at the suggestion and solicitation of a member of the firm,
for the specific purpose of using it in her business. The furniture was delivered, but not paid for, and the firm brought an action of detinue. Held:
That no remedy exists for the plaintiff because the contract was in aid of
a business denounced as a crime by statute. Levy & Co. v. Davis, 80 S.E.
Rep. 791 (Va. 1914).

This case is in accord with the general rule of law which refuses aid to
any party where all are equally guilty of an illegal or immoral transaction.
Inhabitants of Worcester v. Eaton, iiMass. 368 (1814); Hill v. Freeman,
%3Ala. 2oo (1882). The object of the rule, when the contract is executed,
is not to give validity to the transaction but to deprive the parties of all
right to have either enforcement of, or relief from, the illegal agreement,
Roller v. Murray, 112 Va. 780 (1911). The same principle is followed both
at law and in equity, Jourdan v. Burstow, 76 N. J.Eq. 55 (19o9). The mere
fact that a case can be made out without disclosing the illegal character of
the contract will not affect the application of the rule. Levy & Co. v. Davis,
supra.
In case the parties are not in pari delicto, as where one has been led
into the illegal contract by fraud, undue influence, etc., recovery is allowed.
Davidson v. Carter, 55 Ia. 117 (i88o). The court in the principal case said
there was no difference in degree of turpitude between the parties, as each
knowingly was to participate in the fruits of the crime. Even when they
are in pari delicto, recovery is sometimes allowed on the ground that the
public interest will be best served in this way. Hobbs v. Boatright, 195 Mo.
693 (igo6). In this case a gang of swindlers had induced the plaintiff to
join them in a supposed scheme to swindle another party and had turned him
into the victim.
CONTRACTS-MORAL OBLIGATION-An insolvent firm entered into a composition agreement with a number of its creditors who, for certain consideration, agreed to release the firm from its legal obligations to pay the
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debts due them. The firm expressly reserved its moral obligation to pay
the debt of one of those creditors who signed this agreement and release.
It later promised to pay him certain amounts at fixed times and did in fact
make several payments. The creditor sued for the residue and the defendant
demurred. Held: If the debtor in such circumstances elects to reserve a
moral obligation, that reservation will support a subsequent promise to pay.
As the complaint on its face does not show any preference to have been
obtained by the plaintiff over any other creditor, the demurrer is overruled.
Straus v. Cunningham, 144 N. Y. Supp. 1014 (1913).
Lord Mansfield early laid down the rule that any moral obligation was
a sufficient consideration to support a subsequent promise. Atkins v. Hill,
I Cowp. 284 (1775); Hawkes v. Saunders, i Cowp. 290 (1782).

This broad

rule has been generally limited to apply only to cases where a valuable consideration has once existed. Cook v. Bradley, 7 Conn. 57 (1828). And
moral obligations arising from a moral benefit only are almost everywhere
held not to constitute good consideration. Schnell v. Nell, 17 Ind. 29 (i861) ;
Hendricks v. Robinson, 56 Miss. 694 (1879). It is stated as the general rule
of modern times that moral obligation does not amount to consideration.
Roscorla v. Thomas, 3 Q. B. 234 (1842). Where, however, a valid consideration at one time existed creating a legal duty which has been barred by
some positive rule of law, a subsequent promise will be held binding in most
jurisdictions. Turlington v. Slaughter, 54 Ala. 195 (875) ; Ingersoll v.
Martin, 58 Md. 67 (1881).
In cases of bankruptcy, where the creditors are forced to accept in full
legal settlement less than the amount justly owing to them, the moral obligation of the debtor to pay the residue is sufficient consideration to support a subsequent promise. Lambert v. Schmalz, i8 Cal. 33 (1897); Craig
v. Seitz, 63 Mich. 727 (1886). But if the creditors give a voluntary discharge to their debtor, ordinarily the new promise to pay will not be binding. Phelps v. Dennett, 57 Me. 491 (1870). Willing v. Peters, 12 Serg. &
R. 177 (Pa. 1824), contra. Even where the release is voluntary, however,
if the debtor expressly recognizes at the time a moral obligation to settle
in full at a later date and afterwards makes a new promise, there is good
consideration. Taylor v. Hotchkiss, 8o N. Y. S. 1042 (1903). A moral obligation reserved in favor of some but not all of the creditors gives a secret
advantage to the favored ones and invalidates the agreement as to the others.
Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Blake, 142 N. Y. 404 (1894).
CORPORATIONS-LIABILITY FOR PROMOTERS' Acts-Before the organization
of a corporation, one of its promoters was promised the position of superintendent in addition to payment for his time and services in securing stock
subscriptions. He now sues the corporation, claiming that, by accepting the
results of his services and receiving the benefits thereof, it became bound on
an implied contract to pay for such services. There was no evidence of
ratification by the corporation after its organization. Held: There can be
no recovery. In the absence of statutory or charter provision, a corporation is liable for services rendered by its promoters before incorporation
only when, by express action taken after it has been completely organized,
it recognizes or affirms such action. Cushion Heel Shoe Co. v. Hartt, 1o3
N. E. Rep. 1o63 (Ind. 1914).
As a general rule, a corporation cannot be successfully sued on a contract made for its benefit by its promoters before incorporation, in the
absence of adoption or ratification, although it was made in the name of the
proposed corporation and with the understanding that it would perform it.
This is based on the principle that it cannot be estopped by accepting benefits which it had no power to reject without "uncreating" itself. Park v.
Modern Woodmen, 181 Ill. 214 (1899); Abbott v. Hapgood, I5O Mass. 248
(1889); Tuttle v. Tuttle Co., IoI Me. 287 (1go7); Bells Gap Pr. v. Christy,
79 Pa. 54 (1875); Lorillard v. Clyde, 122 N. Y. 498 (i89o). If, however,
after the organization is complete, the corporation adopts or ratifies the contract, it becomes liable thereon; and its liability is not merely for benefits
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received but on the contract itself. The theory is that the corporation has
accepted a continuing offer made to its promoters by the other party and
not revoked by him. Seacoast Pr. v. Wood, 65 N. J. E. 530 (19o3) ; Burden
v. Burden, 159 N. Y. 287 (1899) ; In re Heckman's Estate, 172 Pa. 185 (1896);
Bells Gap Pr. v. Christy, supra.
A promoter, who brings about the organization of a corporation and
aids in securing subscriptions thereto, is considered as occupying a fiduciary
relationship toward such corporation as well as toward its stockholders. He
has the burden of showing that he has acted openly and in good faith in his
transactions with it, in a suit brought against it. Cushion I-I. S. Co. v.
Hartt, supra; Burbank v. Dennis, ioi Cal. 90 (1894); Plaquemine Co. v.
Buch, 52 N. J. E. 219 (1893); Hayward v. Leeson, 176 Mass. 310 (19oo).
If he sues to recover for services rendered in promoting the corporation,
lie must show that lie expected compensation for his services; that they were
rendered at the request of, or tinder a contract with, the associate promoters or a majority of them, that the acts done were necessary to the organization and its objects, and that the corporation received and enjoyed
the benefits thereof. I Thompson Corporations, §89; Low v. Connecticut Pr.
45 N. H. 370 (1864); Tifft v. Quaker City Nat. Bank, 141 Pa. 55o (189i).
CORPORATIONS-STATUTORY

LIABILITY OF

NON-RESIDENT

STOCKHOLDER-A

California creditor sued a New York stockholder of an Arizona corporation formed to carry on business in both Arizona and California. Held:
Although the non-resident stockholder at the time of his subscription agreed
with the company that he should be exempt from personal liability, and
that neither the corporation nor its officers should have power to subject
him or the other stockholders to it; yet, by individually authorizing the acts
in California, lie was bound by all the legal consequences given them by
the California law. Thomas v. Matthiessen, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 312 (1913).
As to the right to enforce this statutory liability of non-resident stockholders the authorities are in an extremely unsatisfactory condition. In
Pinney v. Nelson, 18,3 U. S. 144 (I9Ol), the California law for personal liability was enforced by a California creditor against resident stockholders of
a Colorado corporation, incorporated in a state exempting stockholders from
individual liability. The court in tie principal case takes the logical view
that the doctrine of Pinney v. Nelson applies with equal force to nonresident as to resident stockholders. And this view is supported by ample
authority. I Cook Corporations (7th Ed.), §223- Western National Bank v.
Lawrence, 117 Mich. 669 (i8g8) ; Tompkins v. Blakey, 70 N. H. 584 (i9oi) ;
Shipman v. Treadwell, 2oo N. Y. 472 (1911) ; see also Thomas v. Wentworth
Hotel Co., T58 Cal. 275, 280 (191o).
However, in Risdon Iron & Locomotive Works v. Furness, i K. B. 49,
56 (Eng. 196), the court would not enforce the California statutory liability applicable to stockholders in a foreign corporation doing business in
California as against an English stockholder in an English corporation doing
business in California. The court says that it was not shown that the stockholder authorized the company to carry on business in California on the
terms that lie should incur personal liability in accordance with the law of
that state, although lie had expressly authorized the company to generally
undertake business abroad. Under the general authorization it is difficult to
see why the authority to transact business in California according to the
law of that state was not included. See to like effect: Clarke v. Knowles,
187 Mass. 35 (1904); Miller v. Spaulding, 107 Me. 264 (i9io) ; Hazlett v.
Woodhead, 27 R. I. 506 (19o6) ; McNutt v. Bakewell, 223 Pa. 364 (19o9).
deOF DETECTIVE WITHOUT CORROBORATION-A
DIVORCE-TESTIMONY
tective, hired by a wife suing for divorce, testified that lie had seen the
husband under circumstances which would be enough to support the wife's
charge of adultery, if corroborated. Held: The uncorroborated evidence of
a hired detective is insufficient to break the bonds of matrimony. Enders v.
Enders, 145 N. Y. S. 450 (1914).
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This decision is in accord with the great weight of authority, the theory
being that although the testimony of a person employed to watch a husband
or wife suspected of adultery is competent and ought not to be absolutely
rejected, nevertheless it should be received with great caution, and minutely
scrutinized. Dennis v. Dennis, 68 Conn. i86 (i896); Edmond's App. 57 Pa.
232 (1868); Engleman v. Engleman, 97 Va. 487 (1896); and should be
corroborated either by the facts and circumstances in evidence, or by the
direct testimony of other witnesses, or by both. Moller v. Moller, I15 N. Y.
466 (i899); Blake v. Blake, 70 Ill. 618 (1873); Ginger v. Ginger, L. R. I
P. & D. 38 (Eng. 1865) ; Hickerson v. Hickerson, 52 S. W. 1019 (899) ;
The reason for this rule as set out in Blake v. Blake, supra, is this: "When
a man sets out as a hired discoverer of supposed delinquencies, and the
amount of his pay depends on the extent of his employment, and the latter
depends upon the discoveries he is able to make, the man becomes a dangerous instrument."
The rule in the principal case also applies to other witnesses of impaired credibility, the courts holding that their testimony uncorroborated is
insufficient to warrant a divorce. So, the testimony of convicts, Poertner v.
Poertner, 66 Wis. 664 (1886) ; of servants on the ground that their testimony
is likely to be prejudiced by preference for one party or the other, Dysart v.
Dysart, I Rob. Ec. io6 (Eng. 1844) ; of young children, Crowner v. Crowner,
44 Mich. i8o (i88o), is insufficient.
EVIDENCE-DYING DECLARATIoN-ADMISSIBILITY-On the evening before
the decedent died he made a statement that he knew he was dying, and that
what he said was the truth about the sale of his farm to B. Held: The
evidence is admissible. Thurston v. Fritz, 138 Pac. Rep. 625 (Kan. 1914).
The court specifically repudiated the doctrine that dying declarations are
only admissible in criminal cases involving homicide, although this doctrine
is almost universally accepted. Rex v. Mead, 2 B. & C. 6o5 (Eng. 1824);
Johnson v. State, 5o Ala. 459 (1874) ; State v. Barbar, 28 Ohio St. 583 (1876);
Crookham v. State, 5 W. Va. 5r4 (1871).
The probability of truth element in this exception to hearsay lies in the
theory that the conscious danger of impending death is equivalent to the
sanction of an oath. Rex v. Woodcock, I Leach's Cr. Cas. 5oo (Eng. 1789) ;
Kennedy v. State, 85 Ala. 326 (1888), and the court in the principal case
holds, correctly, it is submitted, that this is as efficacious whether the declarant speaks of a rmrder or a robbery or a fraudulent will. This theory
was advanced by Professor Wigmore, who considered any limitation to the
rule except the declarant's death improper, for the following reasons: (I)
Necessity for the evidence means, not the absence of other evidence from
any source, but merely the absence of other evidence from the same source,
s. e., the declarant. (2) The principal that the evidence should be confined
to homicide rests on wrong assumption, for it is of as much consequence
to the cause of justice that robberies and rapes be punished, and torts and
breaches of trust redressed, as that murderers be detected. (3) The sanction
of a dying declaration is as efficacious whether it speaks of a murder or a
robbery or a fraudulent will, and the necessity being the same, the admissibility should be the same. II Wigmore on Evidence, §1436.
A recent text writer takes the position that dying declarations should
be eliminated altogether as evidence because their admission marks an obvious
lack of fairness to the accused in that there is no chance to cross-examine
the declarant. 4 Chamberlayne on Modern Law of Evidence, §2860.
EVIDENCF-PROOF OF MARRIAGE-On an issue as to whether the decedent

was married to a person claiming to be his widow, parol testimony was given
to show the fact of marriage, although there was a certificate of marriage
which could be obtained. Held: The marriage may be proved by parol, and
it is not necessary to produce the marriage certificate, or explain its absence.
Watson v. Lawrence, 63 So. Rep. 873 (La. 1914).
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The fact of marriage may be proved by testimony of eye witnesses to. the
ceremony. Baughman v. Baughman, 29 Kan. 283 (1883) ; State v. Schweitzer,
57 Conn. 533 (1889) ; McQuade v. Hatch, 65 Vt. 482 (1893) ; or of the person
officiating. People v. lines, no Mich. 250 (1896) ; Casley v. Mitchell, 121 Ia.
96 (i9o3). And a marriage may be established by the testimony of one of
the contracting parties. Com. v. Dill, I56 Mass. 226 (1892) ; Comley's Estate,
185 Pa. 208 (i898). But a certificate or register of marriage is not preferred
to eye witness testimony. People v. Perriman, 72 Mich. 184 (888); Com.
v. Hayden, 163 Mass. 453 (1895) ; Bohrig v. State, 9I Neb. 599 (1912). The
testimony of one who was present at the ceremony comes within what is
termed direct or primary evidence. State v. Clark, 54 N. H. 456 (1874);
Lyman v. People, i98 Ill. 544 (19o2).
The performance of a marriage ceremony between given persons may
properly be established by documentary evidence . Gaines v. Green Pond
Iron Co., 32 N. J. Eq. 86 (i88o). Such as marriage records or registers.
State v. Potter, 52 Vt. 33 (1879) ; Shutesbury v. Hadley, 133 Mass. 242 (1882) ;
the marriage license. Beggs v. State, 55 Ala. i08 (1876) ; Tucker v. People,
122 Ill. 583 (1887) ; and also by the marriage certificate.
Smith v. Smith, 52
N. J. L. 2o7 (1889); Dailey v. Frey, 206 Pa. 227 (19o3).
But where the
certificate is offered as direct and original evidence, the authority of the
officer and his signature must be shown. People v. Crawford, 62 Hun, I6o
(N. Y. i89i).
In Connecticut, however, marriage certificates are treated as original documents and need no authentication as copies. Erwin v. English, 61 Conn. 502
(1892). And entries in the family Bible have been held admissible after the
death of the person making the entry provided the book is produced from the
proper custody. Weaver v. Leiman, 52 Md. 708 (1879).
EVIDENcE-RFPUTATIoN-A

woman in attempting to take some hay away

from the defendant was injured by him. In a civil action for assault and
battery instituted by her it was proved that she was the aggressor and the
case turned on whether the defendant used unnecessary force. He was
allowed to show her reputation for turbulence and violence and was awarded
the verdict. Held: Such evidence is not admissible. Campbell v. Aarstad,
144 N. W. Rep'tr, 956 (Minn. 1914).
It is a general rule of evidence that the character of parties to a civil
action is inadmissible unless directly in issue, Largent v. Beard, 53 S. W. 9o
(Tex. i89g); McCarty v. Coffin, 157 Mass. 478 (1892); Dunham v. Rackliff,
71 Me. 345 (i88o); Meyer v. Suburban Home Co., 55 N. Y. S. 566 (1894);
Shirley v. Keagy, 126 Pa. 282 (1889); Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Coborn, i18
Pa. 230 (1888), as chastity in an action for breach of promise of marriage,
McCarty v. Coffin, supra; indecent assault, Bingham v. Bernard; rape or
seduction, Goldsmith v. Pichard, 27 Ala. 142 (1855).
But there is an exception to the general rule, which original was recognized in criminal cases when the issue of self defense is made in a trial for
homicide and thus a controversy arises whether the deceased was the aggressor, that the character of the deceased will be admitted as evidence to show
his actions, Karr v. State, ioo Ala. 4 (1893) ; and this first was extended to
civil cases concerning homicide, Williams v. Fambro, 3o Ga. 233 (86o), and
later to other civil actions where self defense is pleaded. Hein v. Holdridge,
78 Minn. 468 (19oo) ; Wigmore Ev., §63, note I. But, as stated in the principal case, such evidence is admissible only where the question arises as to
which party was the aggressor and the one pleading self defense has knowledge of the other's reputation. Lowe v. Rine, 123 Wis. 107 (19o3) ; Danneberg v. Barkner, 118 Ga. 885 (19o3); People v. Kirk, 151 Mich. 253 (198o);
People v. Rodawald, supra; Wigmore Ev., §63, note I, and §64.
FOREIGN

ATTACHMFNT-RESIDENcE-The

maintenance of a domicile in

the state in which an action has been started by a writ of foreign attachment
is no bar to that action where it is shown that the defendant has been out
of the jurisdiction for a period of twelve years as an ambassador and there
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is no immediate hope for his return.

Raymond v. Leishman, 243 Pa. 64

(1914).

This case was decided under the Acts June 13, 1836 (P. L. 58o) and
March 30, 1905 (P. L. 76), which provide for starting actions by attachment
against persons "not residing within the Commonwealth."
While the words "domicile" and "residence" have been used very loosely
and have often been confused, there is a distinct difference in their meaning
at least as used in statutes relating to foreign attachment. One may have
two residences in two different states at the same time, and in neither of
those states will action started by attachment be successful. Barron v. Burke,
82 III. App. 116 (1898); Long v. Ryan, 71 Va. 718 (1878). The essential
element in the institution of attachment proceedings is non-residence in the
state in which the action is brought and proof of indefinite absence without
proving residence at any other place is sufficient to ground such an action.
Carden v. Carden, 107 N. C. 214 (180o). It has been held that before this
action can be brought, there must be proof of the residence of the defendant
in another jurisdiction and not only proof of his non-residence in the state
of attachment. Lawson v. Adlard, 46 Minn. 243 (1891). Both of the above
cases agree with the principal case that domicile in the state in which the
action was started is not in itself enough to bar the action. The rule has been
stated that if the defendant has no place of abode within the jurisdiction
at which summons could be served, then he is a non-resident and attachment
proceedings are proper. Baldwin v. Flagg, 43 N. J. L. 495 (1881). A debtor
may be a non-resident of the jurisdiction where he has a place of business.
Wallace v. Castle, 68 N. Y. 370 (1877); Chase v. N. Y. Bank, 56 Pa. 355
(1867).
INJUNCTIoN-RIGHT OF PRIVACY-A

moving picture company employed a

person made up to represent the plaintiff as a principal character in one of
its films. This film was exhibited throughout the country. The plaintiff
prayed an injunction. Held: The company's act was a use of a person's
picture within the terms of the Civil Rights Law. Consol. Laws, c. p, §51
(N. Y. 19o9), and was therefore restrained. Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of
America, 1O3 N. E. Rep. iio8 (N. Y. 1913).
The so-called "right of privacy" is a recent addition to the law. It was
brought to the attention of the courts in an article by Messrs. Warren and
Brandeis in 4 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 193 (1890). Since then the right has not
been very generally recognized and the weight of authority seems to be
against the existence of such right. Corliss v. Walker Co., 64 Fed. Rep. 280
(1894); Atkinson v. Doherty Co., 121 Mlich. 372 (1899); Robertson v.
Rochester Folding Box Co., 65 App. Div. 38 (N. Y. 19oi); Henry v. Cheney,
73 Atl. Rep. 97 (R. I. 19o9). However, a few States have recognized the
existence of the right of privacy as a legal right; thus the unauthorized use
by one of a picture of another has been enjoined. Pavesich v. New England
Life Ins. Co., 5o S. E. Rep. 68 (Ga. 19o5); Foster-Millburne Co. v. Chinn,
12o S. W. Rep. 364 (Ky. 19o9); Minden v. Harris, 134 S. W. Rep. 1O76
(Mo. 1911). In New York, the same result has been reached by the Civil
Rights Law, supra, which provides that a person may restrain the unauthorized use of his name or picture for the purpose of trade, thus overthrowing
the Roberson case supra. The principal case shows a logical though rather
extreme extension of this statute to the use of pictures, not of the plaintff
himself, but of an impersonation of him.
This right of privacy is a purely personal right; it is not enjoyed by
corporations, Vassar College v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., 197 Fed. Rep. 982,
61 U.

OF P.

L. REV. 12,(

I912).

JOINT TORT FEAsoRs-APPORTIONED VEMRCT-In an action to recover damages for a malicious abuse of legal process, verdicts were rendered in favor
of the plaintiff against the defendants separately and separate judgments
were entered. One of the defendants paid the judgment against him and
this was satisfied of record. Execution was issued on the judgment against
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the other defendant, who thereupon moved to restrain the sheriff. Held:
The verdict here rendered was improper in form and should have been for
one amount against both defendants. As the plaintiff, however, was satisfied
with the form of the verdict and entered a judgment against each defendant, he is not now in a position to complain that the satisfaction of one judgment has satisfied the other.

Foy v. Barry, 144 N. Y. S 971 (1913).

joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the injury resulting
from their wrongful act, and may be proceeded against either singly or
jointly. Bailey v. Delta Electric Light Co., 86 Miss. 634 (19o5) ; Weathers
v. Kansas City Ry. Co., iii Mo. App. 315 (1905).

And where a general verdict

is rendered against the defendants, the plaintiff can look to any one of them
for the entire amount of the verdict. Mashburn & Co. v. Dannenberg Co
117 Ga. 567 (i9o3).

But the verdict in a joint action cannot be apportioned

among the defendants, nor can separate judgments be entered against them.
Hunter v. Wakefield, 97 Ga. 543 (1895). As the act and its consequences
are indivisible, there can be only one satisfaction, although there may be
several suits and recoveries. Walsh v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 204 N. Y.
58 (1912).
So, where the jury return separate verdicts and separate judgments are
entered upon them, when one is paid the other defendants may have their
judgments satisfied without any payment on their part. Breslin v. Peck,
38 Hun. 623 (N. Y. I886); Foy v. Barry, supra. Although the defendants
sever their defenses, the jury have no power to sever the damages, and judgments cannot be entered against the several defendants for several amounts.
Greenlands Lt. v. Wilmshurst & Trade Ass'n, 3 K. B. 507 (Eng. 1913). But
if the jury apportion the damages recovered among joint plaintiffs, this is
no ground for complaint by the defendant. Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Stewart, 37 S. W. Rep. 770 (Tex. 1896).
JUDGMENT-EFFECT OF ENTRY AFTER DEATH OF A PARTY-A obtained judgment against B. B appealed, giving an appeal bond on which C was a surety.
The appellate court affirmed the judgment against B and accordingly entered
the judgment as against B and his sureties. C had died prior to the rendition of this judgment. In a proceeding by A against C's executor, the
defense attacked the judgment against C on the ground that it had been
entered subsequent to his death and was therefore void. Held: The judgment cannot be attacked collaterally in this action; it was merely voidable.
Gunby v. Cooller, 164 S. W. Rep. 152 (Mo. 1914).
The court in its opinion says inter alia, "If the party dies during the
pendency of a suit wherein the court by legal process has acquired jurisdiction over both the person and the subject matter, but before judgment, and
a judgment is rendered against such party so dying, without there being any
record showing such death, then such judgment is voidable only and not
void. But on the other hand, if the party was dead at the institution of the
suit, and the court for that reason acquired no jurisdiction over the person
or subject matter, then such judgment is void." This is in accord with the
great weight of authority. I Black Judgments (2 Ed.) §200; Van Fleet,
Collateral Attack §602; 1 Freeman Judgments (4 Ed.) §153.
At the common law, an action was abated by the death of a sole plaintiff or defendant. I Black Judgments (2 Ed.) §Y99. Accordingly, some States
hold that a judgment rendered for or against a dead person is void under
all circumstances. Wert v. Jordan, 62 Me. 484 (1873): Edwards v. Whited,
29 La. Ann. 647 (1877) ; Young v. Pickens, 45 Miss. 553 (1871); Watson
v. Adams, io3 Ga. 733 (I898); the same as against an extinct corporation,
Sturges v. Vanderbilt, 73 N. Y. 384 (1898) ; Clay v. Buchanan, 63 Iowa i88
(1884). Other States go to the opposite extreme and hold that such judgment is, at most. voidable under all circumstances. This is placed on the
ground that its rendition implies that the parties are living, and to show
the converse is to dispute the verity of the record. Warde v. Tainer, 4 Watts
The great pre270 Pa. (1835) ; Taylor v. Snow, 47 Tex. Rep. 462 (1877).
ponderance of authority, however, holds that where the court has acquired
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the persons during the lifetime of a

658

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

party, a judgment rendered against him after his death is, although erroneous
and liable to be set aside, not void or open to collateral attack. i Black Judgments (2 Ed.) §2oo; Claflin v. Dunne, 129 Ill. z4i (1889). New Orleans
v. Whitney, 138 U. S. 595 (i89o); Reid v. Holmes, 127 Mass. 326 (1879);
Livingston v. Rendall, 59 Barb. 193 CN. Y. 1871); State v. Riley, 219 Mo.
667 (1909).
JUDGMENTs-FOREIGN

JUDGMENTs-ENFORCEMENT-The

judgment

of a

foreign court against a non-resident subject, who was not served with process in thd jurisdiction in which the judgment was obtained, will not be
enforced although it was properly rendered according to the laws of the
jurisdiction in which recovered and although it could be enforced in that
country. Grubler v. Nassauer, io3 N. E. Rep. 1113 (N. Y. 1913).
A distinction is drawn between the recognition of foreign judgments,
and those of sister States. The latter must be enforced in compliance with
the "full faith and credit" clause (U. S. Const., Art. 4, Sec.i). N. Y. Ry.
Co. v. McHenry, 17 Fed. Rep. 414 (1883). Principles of comity alone must
be recognized in the enforcement of foreign judgments. Hilton v. Guyot,
159 U. S. 113 (I895). The court in the Nassaner Case profess no intention
to reverse an earlier case which holds that judgments of State courts, obtained without personal service on the defendant will he enforced if the
defendant was domiciled in the State in which the judgment was obtained
and service was by some means approved in the State in which the judgment was recovered. Huntley v. Baker, 33 Hun. 578 (N. Y. 1884).
A personal judgment against one who is neither a citizen within that
jurisdiction or a subject of the jurisdiction, will not be enforced beyond that
jurisdiction unless the defendant has been personally served. McEwan v.
Zimmer, 38 Mich 765 (1878); Buchanan v. Rucker, 9 East 192 (Eng. i868);
Schibsby v. Westenholz, L. R. 6 Q. B. I54 (Eng. i87o). Nor will the judgment be enforced in the jurisdiction in which recovered without personal
service unless in strict accordance with statutes providing for artificial forms
of service. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877); Wilson v. Palace Car
Co., 65 N. J. Eq. 730 (i9o3). To obtain jurisdiction over one not a citizen
or subject in a personal action, there must be not only personal service of
the defendant, but personal service within the jurisdiction in which the
judgment was rendered. Sirdar Gurdy al Surgh v. Rajah of Faridkote, App.
A court has
Cas. 67o (Eng. i9o4); Darrah v. Watson, 36 Ia. 16 (873).
jurisdiction over its property, citizens or residents and any judgments recovered against such property or persons will be recognized abroad although
service may have been by some artificial method. London & N. Y. Ry. Co. v.
Lindsey, 3 Macq. 99 (Scot. 1858). The point was raised but not determined
whether the ownership of property in Scotland will give extra-territorial
effect to a judgment rendered against that owner according to Scottish law,
when the owner was not a native, nor personally served, but it is almost
certain that such judgments would not be recognized, except as to the property in the jurisdiction in which the judgment was recovered. Directly
contra to the principal case are cases which hold that subjects of a foreign
country are bound to recognize the judgments obtained against them according to -the law of their country, although there was no personal service.
Douglass v. Forrest, 4 Bing. 686 (Eng. 1828) ; Ouseley v. Lehigh Trust Co.,
There are dicta to the effect that while there is no
84 Fed. Rep. 6o2 (887).
duty on a non-resident foreigner to obey a judgment obtained without personal service within the jurisdiction in which the judgment was obtained,
there is such a duty on subjects of the sovereignty in which the judgment
was pronounced. Schibsby v. Westenholz, supra. Where the defendant
who was not served pleads the judgment as a bar to an action on the original
demand, he is thereafter estopped to deny the jurisdiction of the former
court in an action on the judgment. Cornwall v. Davis, 58 Fed. Rep. 878
(I889) ; Henderson v. Staniford, r05 Mass. 504 (1870). These cases hold a
judgment against a citizen of a State without personal service voidable by
the -defendant.
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JUDGMENTs-Res Judicata-The plaintiff in an action for compensation
for services rendered, alleged the reasonable value thereof, and that the
defendant agreed to pay a certain sum therefor. He was not put to an
election upon which theory lie proceeded on, but both issues were retained
in the case. The jury returned a general verdict for the defendant and
now the plaintiff attempted to sue the defendant again for the reasonable
value of the services. Held: The judgment rendered in the first action is
res judicata and constitutes a complete bar to a subsequent action even
though no evidence was presented on the trial of the first action to support
the count for reasonable value of services. Kinzel v. Boston & Duluth Farm
Land Co., i45 N. W. Rep. 124 (Minn. 1914).
As a general rule a fact or question which was actually and directly in
issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon and determined
by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment
th'erein, so far as concerns the parties to that action and persons in privity
with them, and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such
parties or privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction upon the same or a different cause of action Intermela v. Perkins,
2o5 Fed. Rep. 6o3 (913); Gibbs v. Peterson, 163 Cal. 758 (19r2); Lemon
v. Teter, 169 Il1. App. 503 (1912) ; Emmest v. Middlekauff, uS Md. 399
(i9i2); In re Bowers, 24o Pa. 388 (1913); Beardsley v. Beardsley, i Q. B.
746 (Eng. i899) ; Harding v. Harding, 198 U. S. 317 (904).
If the second action is the same, the majority of courts hold that not
only all the issues which were in fact litigated, but also every matter which
might have been litigated is barred by the judgment. White v. Hewitt, ii9
Minn. 340 (1912) ; Cromwell v. County of Lac., 94 U. S. 351 (1876) ; United
Oil Co. v. Ellsworth, 43 Ind. App. 670 (i9o8); Fitch v. Stanton Tp., i9o
Fed. Rep. 310 (1911) ; Newhall v. Enterprise Co., 205 Mass. 585 (19o) ; Morton v. Harrison, iii Md. 536 (igog) ; Thorn v. De Breiteul, 179 N. Y. 64
(i9o4) ; Hawkshurst v. Asbury Park, 65 N. Y. Eq. 496 (1903) ; Allen v. International Text B. Co., 201 Pa. 579 (1902).
On the other hand if the second action is different but still between the
same parties or their privies the judgment in the prior action operates as an
estoppel only as to those matters actually litigated. Cromwell v. County of
Lac., supra. Lim. Jew. v U. S., 196 Fed. Rep. 736 (:I92); Stokes v. Foote,
r72 N. Y. 327 (1902) ; Lentz v. Wallace. 17 Pa. 412 (1851) ; Kaff v. Shields,
Some
17 Pa. Super. Ct. 524 (igoI) ; Watts v. Watts, 16o Mass 464 (894).
hold that the party invoking the estoppel has the burden of showing that
the precise issue was actually litigated and decided in the former suit. i Van
Fleet, Former Adjudications 618. While others hold to the rule that prima
facie, the parties are ocncluded upon all the issues presented. Rhodes v.
City, 144 Il1. 58o (i8gi) ; Sheldon v. Edwards, 35 N. Y. 279 (1866) ; Bottorf
v. Wise, 53 Ind. 32 (1876); Haln v. Miller, 68 Iowa 745 (r886). 62 U. OF
P. L. REv. 39o (March, 1914).
LANDLORD AND TENANT-TITLE OF LANDLORD--ESTOPPEL TO DENY-An oil
company, common lessee of two adjoining tracts, entered and took possesssion of a particular part of the leased lands as lessee of one of the tracts,

drilled an oil well, gave notice to the public of its holding by putting a large

sign on the walking beam, and paid royalties to the lessor under whose lease

such entry was made. Held: After the statute of limitations had fully run
the company was not estopped to deny the title of the other lessor, although
such well be in fact located on his lands. Lockwood v. Carter Oil Company, 8o S. E. Rep. 814 (W. Va. 1913).
This decision proceeds on the theory that the relationship of landlord
and tenant between the real owner and the company, as to the particular well
in question and the land on which it was located, was never established; so
the rule that "a lessee who has never gone into possession under his lease is
free to deny the title of the lessor" applies. Jones, Landlord and Tenant,
.§694; Wright v. Graves, 8o Ala. 46 (I885) ; Ireton v. Ireton, 59 Kan. 92

(1898).
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In the principal case there is a strong dissenting opinion by Williams,
on the ground that the company in fact entered the tract in question under
the lease of the real owner, since the adjoining owner, under whom the company thought it was entering, had neither actual nor constructive possession
of same, and therefore the company could not enter under him.
The general doctrine of estoppel precludes a tenant during the continuance of his possession under a lease from buying in and setting up an adverse
title to defeat an action of ejectment, or a suit for rent. Bertram v. Cook, 32
Mich, 58 (1875) ; Cooper v, Smith, 8 Watts 536 (Pa. 1839). But the estoppel
only extends to the land included in the lease. Brenner v. Bigelow, 8 Kan.
496 (187I) ; State v. Boyce, io9 N. C. 739 (i89i). By their own agreement
the parties may waive the rule of law that a tenant cannot deny his landlord's
title. Mayor, etc., v. Bridge Co., 4 Binn. 283 (Pa. I81I). After the expiration of his lease, a tenant may disclaim and disavow his tenancy without
first surrendering possession of the leased premises. Holman v. Bonner, 63
Miss. 131 (1885); Voss v. King, 33 W. Va. 236 (I889); 38 W. Va. 6o7
(1893) ; but contra, Dasher v. Ellis, lO2 Ga. 83o (1897). The general rule
cannot be so extended as to take away from the tenant his right to prove
exactly what his relationship to the landlord originally was, Wilborn v. Whitfield, 44 Ga. 5i (1871) ; Mays v. Dwight, 82 Pa. 462 (1876), or mutual mistake
as to existence of well on the leased premises; Smith v. Smith, 8x Tex. 45
J.,

(i89').

MASTER AND SERVANT-AsSAULT BY SERVANT-SCOPE

OF

EmPLOYMENT-

Three men were sent to collect a bill for furniture purchased by a former
resident of the house, and were instructed to demand the return of the
furniture if payment was refused, but should such return also be refused.
not to use force. The men attempted to take the furniture contrary to
orders and when the party in possession of the house resisted, they assaulted
her. In an action for damages against the employer, the court left it to the
jury to decide whether or not these men were acting within the scope of
their employment when they injured the plaintiff. The jury found for the
plaintiff. Held: The case was properly submitted to the jury. Judgment
affirmed. Veneroso v. Spear & Co., 145 N. Y. Supp. 1043 (914).
This case falls within the general rule that the master is liable for all
acts of his servants done within the scope of their employment. Dinsmore
v. Wolber, 85 Ill. Appt 152 (1899). The act of a servant within the scope
of his employment is considered by the law as the act of his master. Rooney
v. Woolworth, 78 Conn. 167 (195o). But the act in such case as this must
be within the servant's actual, not only apparent, authority. McGrath v.
Whether or not the servant is
Michaels, go N. Y. App. Div. 458 (9O3).
acting within the scope of his employment is usually a question of fact for
the jury. Baltimore Ry. Co. v. Pierce, 89 Md. 495 (I899). But when the
facts are undisputed and it clearly appears that the act of the servant was
outside the line of his employment, it is the duty of the court to so declare.
Connor v. P; R. R., 24 Pa. Sup. Ct. 241 (19o4).
A dissenting opinion in the principal case considered that the complaint
should have been dismissed by the lower court without allowing the case
to go to the jury. Where the servant is merely a collector of installments
and has no authority whatever to remove the subject matter of the sale, this
is undoubtedly the correct view. Murphy v. Newhall, 155 N. Y. App. Div.
52o (1912). It is just as clear that the master is liable when he gives to his
servant unqualified instructions to get the money or remove the property. Levi
It would seem that the fact of sending
v. Brooks, I21 Mass. 50, (877).

three men with a wagon, as was done in the principal case, does
of the court declaring as a matter of law that the use of force to
furniture was outside of the scope of the employment. Where the
quite similar and the servants had been instructed not to commit
and battery and not to break the law, a similar result was reached.
v. Dearborne, 134 Pa. 396 (I89o).

not admit
retake the
facts were
an assault
McClung

RECENT CASES
NEGLIGENcE-ELECTRICITY-The

defendant furnished electricity for are

lighting. The electric company did not own or have any control over the
wires or appliances by which the current was carried. Through defective
insulation of the wires a boy was killed by an electric shock. Held: The
defendant was not liable in the absence of knowledge of the defective condition of the wires. Hoffman v. Leavenworth Light, Heat & Power Co.,
138 Pac. Rep. 632 (Kan. 1914).
The decision rests on the theory that one who provides and controls the
apparatus over which the current is conveyed is bound to attend to its
safety and that its mere supply to such party does not render the party
supplying it responsible for the condition of the apparatus. Harter v. Colfax
Electric Light Co., 124 Ia. 5oo (igoo) ; National Fire Ins. Co. v. Denver Elec.
Co., i6 Colo. App. 86 (igoi) ; Minneapolis General Elec. Co. v. Carson, 166
Fed. Rep. 651 (io8); Fickensen v. Wheeling Elec. Co., 67 W. Va. 335 (191o).
But another theory holds that by the act of furnishing for use so dangerous
a force as an electric current, a party is bound to know that the poles and
wires are in such condition that the furnishing of the current will not endanger life and limb. Hoboken v. United Elec. Co., 7r N. J. L. 430 (1904) ;
Herbert v. Hudson River Elec. Co., 136 App. Div. 157 (N. Y. i9o9); Lewis,
Adm'r, v. Bowling Green Gas Co., 135 Ky. 611 (igo9).
The duty of one who makes use of a dangerous electric current has
been likened to that of the owner of a ferocious beast, who is bound at his
peril not to let him escape. Atlanta Consol. St. Ry. Co. v. Owings, 97 Ga.
663 (1895). Or to that of one who stores up water and is bound to keep
it in, or at least to take great care that it does no harm. National Bell Teleg.
Co. v. Baker, 2 Chan. 183 (Eng. 1893). So high a degree of care is required, where the electric light company supplies both the current and
apparatus, that if a person is injured by taking hold of the company's incandescent light bulb, the doctrine res ipsa loquitur applies. Alexander v.
Nanticoke Light Co., 205 Pa. 571 (1904). Most courts hold that the electric company owes a duty of ordinary care under the circumstances, the
degree of care being commensurate with the dangers incident to the nature
of the business. Ladow v. Oklahoma Elec. Co., 28 Okl. I5 (iii);
Casey
v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 169 Ill. App. 425 (1912). While the vendor company has no duty of inspecting the wires of the purchasing company, Perry
v. Ohio Valley Elec. Ry. Co., 74 S. E. Rep. 993 (W. Va. 1912); yet, if it
continued to furnish and turn on the dangerous current after knowing that
the purchaser had permitted the equipment to become defective, the company
would be liable. Antonio Elec. Co., v. Ocon, 146 S. W. Rep. 162 (Tex. 1912).
NUISANCE-WHAT CONSTITUTEs-Summer residents of the village of Bay
View in Gloucester, Mass., filed a bill in equity to restrain the owner of
several granite quarries from operating his surfacing machines which created
a very loud and disagreeable noise. The neighborhood was peculiarly adapted
for summer residence and there were valuable stone quarries in the vicinity.

Both of these uses commenced about the same time and had grown up together. Held: That the defendant should be restrained from operating his
machines in such an unreasonable manner as to interfere with the reason-

able comfort and enjoyment of life by the plaintiffs or other persons of
ordinary sensibilities occupying their houses. Stevens v. Rockport Granite
Co., 104 N. E. Rep. 371 (Mass. 1914).

Where each of two persons is using his own respective property in a
reasonable way, but the use of one results in injury to the other, three dif-

ferent rules have been applied. If the particular act complained of is necessary for the reasonable use to which the defendant has put his property, an
injunction will not be granted. Davis v. Sawyer, 133 Mass. 289 (1882). The
test should be whether an injunction would result in more damage to the

defendant than his acts are causing to the plaintiff. Richards Appeal, 57
Pa. 105 (i868). Provided only that the plaintiff show an existing nuisance
and a reasonable use in himself, an injunction will always be granted. Reinhart v. Mentasti, 42 Ch. D. 685 (Eng. i888).
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A lawful business cannot be a nuisance per se, but from its surrounding
places and circumstances, or the manner in which it is conducted, it may
In debecome a nuisance. McGregor v. Camden, 47 W. Va. 193 (1899).
termining whether a nuisance exists, the principal question is always as to
the reasonableness of the use of the property. United States v. Luce, 141
Fed. Rep. 385 (19o5). Reference must always be had to the locality, nature
of trade, character of machinery, and the manner of using the property. Dittman v. Repp, 50 Md. 516 (1878). Although the noises of industrial enterprises are not frequently characterized as nuisances, yet they must be held
to be such when extreme and tortious. Froelicher v. Oswald Iron Works, iii
La. 705 (1903).
PLEADING-JO1NDER OF COUNTS-A cause of action based on a common
law right and a cause of action under a statutory right (the Federal Employees' Liability Act) may be joined in different counts in the same declaration. Bonchard v. Central Vermont Ry. Co., 89 At. Rep. 475 (Vt. 1914).
The court said inter alia, "It is the policy of the law to permit and
encourage the joinder of causes of action that are of the same nature and are
to be pursued in the same form of action. . . . And it is not now considered material, that a statutory cause of action is joined with one at
common law." In accord with the principal case on similar facts are Marquette, etc., Co. v. Diele, 2o8 Ill. 116 (19o4); Creen v. Michigan, etc., R. R.,
I68 Mich. 1O4 (1911) ; Worster v. Canal Bridge, 16 Pick. 541 (Mass. 1835);
McLaughlin v. Hebron Co., i7i Fed. Rep. 269 (I99). The weight of authority
also is that, in an action of personal injuries, two or more acts of negligence,
contributing to the injury complained of, may properly be charged in one
count. Bishop Co. v. Shelhorse, 141 Fed. Rep. 643 (19o5); Braunstein v.
Peoples R. R., i Boyce, 310 (Del. 191o) ; Pennsylvania Co. v. Witte, 15 Ind.
App. 583 (1896) ; Southern R. R. v. Blanford, 105 Va. 373 (19o6) ; Payne v.
New York R. R., 2O N. Y. 436 (i911). But a breach of duty imposed by common law and a breach of duty imposed by statute must be embodied in separate counts. Yazoo, etc., R. R. v. Wallace, 9o Miss. 6og (19o8) ; Matz v.
Chicago, etc., R. R., 88 Fed. Rep. 770 (1898).
The practice of pleading a single cause of action by stating the facts
differently in separate counts in the same declaration is the result of an
ancient relaxation of the rule against duplicity. It was allowed where the
nature of the facts, on which the claim of the plaintiff rested, made it
doubtful whether a single count might not fail to justify a recovery, either
from insufficiency in law or inability to have competent proof to properly
support the claim. Shipman Common Law Pleading (2nd Ed.), 256. But
the counts must always purport to be founded on different causes of action
and not refer to the same matter, so as not to directly violate the rule against
duplicity. Stephens Pleading (2nd Ed.), 187.
PROPERTY-DELIVERY OF DEED TO DEPOSITARY-RECALL-The grantor delivered the deed, reserving life estate, to depositary with instructions to deliver
to the grantee upon the grantor's death. The latter intended to make a final
disposition of the property thereby granted, and did not reserve any right of
control over the deed. Held: The delivery to the depositary was absolute and
the grantor during his lifetime had no right to recall the deed. Upon his
death, title vested absolutely in the grantee. Dickson v. Miller, 145 N. VV.
Rep. 112 (Minn. 1914).
Where a grantor executes a deed and delivers it to a third person to
hold until the death of the grantor who parts with all dominion over it, and
reserves no right to recall the deed or to alter its provisions, it is settled
by the weight of authority that the delivery to the depositary vests title
Rowley
immediately in the grantee. Schurz v. Schurz, 153 Ia. 187 (iio):
v. Rowley, 75 N. J. Eq. 8o (19o8); Thatcher v. Andrews. 37 Mich. 264
(1877) ; Brown v. Westerfield, 47 Neb. 399 (1896) ; Klabunde v. Casper, 139
Wis. 491 (igog). In some jurisdictions, it has been held that the grantee's
interest is subject to a life estate in favor of the grantor, although such a
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reservation was not expressly made by the latter. Bury v. Young, 98 Cal.
446 (1893) ; Arnegaard v. Arnegaard, 7 N. D. 475 (1898) ; Maxwell v.
Harper, 51 Wash. 351 (19o). However, in some states the rule is that title
does not pass to the grantee, until delivery by the depositary after the
grantor's death, Stephens v. Rinehart, 72 Pa. 434 (1872); McCalla v. Bane,
45 Fed. Rep. 828 (1891); except, when, in order to protect the rights of the
grantee as against those of third persons, it is necessary to adopt the fiction
of relation, by virtue of which the deed is said to take effect from the first
delivery. Kirkwood v. Smith, 212 Ill. 395 (1904).
If the grantor fails to relinquish all control over the instrument at the
time of the delivery to the depositary, it differs in no wise from a will,
according to the weight of authority, because not until the moment of the
grantor's death can it be regarded as definitely intended to be operative.
Consequently, it is not effectual, unless duly executed. Doe v. Bennett, 8 C.
& P. 124 (Eng. 1837); Stimson v. Anderson, 96 Ill. 373 (188o); Jones v.
Loveless, 99 Ind. 317 (1884) ; Hale v. Joslin, 134 Mass. 310 (1883) ; Cook v.
Brown, 34 N. H. 46o (1857). In a few jurisdictions, however, it has been
held that the fact that the grantor reserved the power to revoke the deed,
will not invalidate it, if he dies, without having exercised the right of revocation. Morse v. Slason, 13 Vt. 296 (1841) ; Ruggles v. Lawson, 13 Johns. 285
(N. Y. 1816) ; and title passes to the grantee upon the death of the grantor.
Lippold v. Lippold, 112 Ia. 134 (1900).
RAILROADs-RIG-T

OF WAY-GRANT OF EASEIENT-A

landowner deeded

a right of way one hundred feet in width through his property to a railway
company; and at the same time, the company established a private crossing
or way over its tracks for the benefit of the landowner, and granted same
to him. More than twenty years later the company elevated its tracks, and
an action was brought to compel it to reduce this elevation so as not to interfere with the easement which it had granted. Held: The railway company had no right to grant any easement in the land inconsistent with its
own use of the right of way for railroad purposes. Lincoln v. Great Northern
R. Co., 144 N. W. Rep. 713 (N. D. 1914).
As a general proposition a public or private way may be granted by a
railway company across its tracks and can be acquired by long use on the
part of the public or individual. Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Townsend, 19o U. S.
267, 272 (1902) ; C. C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Munsell, 94 Ill. App. io (ipoo) ;
Turner v. Fitchburg R. Co., 145 Mass. 433 (1888); Easley v. Missouri P. R.
Co., 113 Mo. 236 (1892) ; Plitt v. Cox, 43 Pa. 486 (1862). However, such an
easement as in the principal case cannot be acquired if inconsistent with the
company's use of its right of way for railroad purposes. Turner v. Fitchburg R. Co., supra. But a few jurisdictions have taken the other view on
the grounds that railroads are public highways, constructed for the advantage of the public; and a railroad right of way is such a public use as to prevent the running of the statute of limitations, and the acquisition of a prescriptive title to any part thereof in favor of private persons. Southern Pac.
Co. v. Hyatt, 132 Cal. 24o (19o1) ; Toronto, H. & B. R. Co. v. Simpson Brick
Co., 17 Ont. L. Rep. 632 (ipo9), on ground of ultra vires.
Where the use was, at its inception, permissive, its mere continuance for
the statutory period will not ripen into a hostile right. Hastings v. C., R. I.
& P. R. Co., 148 Iowa, 390 (1io); Penn. R. Co. v. Hulse, 59 N. J. L. 54
(I896). If the way is along and by the side of the track, and not across,
the better view seems to be that the mere use of the right of way by the
public for purposes of travel, however long continued and notorious, cannot
be regarded as adverse. Sapps v. N. Cent. R. Co., 51 Md. II5 (1878) ; Penn.
R. Co. v. Freeport. 138 Pa. 91 (189o).
in several states, statutes have been
enacted expressly exempting land used for right of way from the operation
of the statute of limitation or the law of prescription. Durham v. S. R.
CO.. %21 Fed. Rep. 894 (mpo3): Simpson v. Boston & M. R. Co., 176 Mass.
59 ( mioo) : Costillo v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 7o N. H. 403 (9oo); Drouin v.
Boston, etc., R. Co., 74 Vt. 343 (1902).
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SPECIFIC PERFORMA NTCE-CON TRACT TO WILL-The decedent orally agreed
with the mother of the plaintiff, that, if the latter were allowed to live as a
son with the decedent, he would rear and educate him and leave him all his
property at his death. Held: Since the plaintiff, in consequence of the agreement, had assumed a relation, pursuant to which services incapable of pecuniary valuation had been rendered, specific performance would be decreed
against the heirs of the decedent, who died intestate. Brasch v. Reeves, 144
N. W. Rep. 744 (Minn. 1913).

Specific performance of a contract to will is not possible, strictly speaking, for the reason that a testamentary paper is revocable and also because
after the death of the promisor, his representative cannot be compelled to
make a will in his name. Nevertheless, a court of equity will give an
equivalent remedy by requiring those upon whom the legal title has descended
to convey the property in accordance with the terms of the contract. Cassey
v. Fitton, 2 Hargrave, Judicial Arguments, 296 (1679); Allen v. Bumberg,
147 Ala. 317 (i9o6); Teats v. Flanders, 118 Mo. 66o (1893); Winne v. Winne,
166 N. Y. 263 (i9ox) ; Taylor v. Mitchell, 87 Pa. 518 (1878) ; Burdine v. Burdine's Ex'r, 98 Va. 515 (1goo).
A contract to pay by Will for services defeats recovery therefor during
the life of the promisor. Patterson v. Patterson, 13 Johns. 379 (N. Y. 1816).
The rule is otherwise where performance of a contract to devise has become impossible, in consequence of a conveyance to a third person. Conrad
v. Conrad, 6 Cush. 15 (Mass. 185o). However, equity will enjoin the promisor
from making such a conveyance. Pflugar v. Pultz, 43 N. J. Eq. 44o (1887).
If the conveyance has already been made. the grantee will be directed to hold
the land conveyed for the grantor, until the latter's death, and then to convey
to the beneficiary. Gupton v. Gupton, 47 Mo. 37 (1870).
As a general rule, a covenant to leave all the property or a share of
all the property of the covenantor applies only to such property as he dies
possessed of, and does not prevent him from disposing during his lifetime of
any part of his property. lit re Brookman's Trust, L. R. 5 Ch. App. Cas.
182 (1869). But an agreement to settle personal property will not be permitted to be evaded by investing it in the purchase of land. Lewis v. Madock,
8 Ves. 15o (Eng. 18o3). A covenant not to revoke a will cannot be specifically
enforced; but an action for damages will lie for a breach thereof. Robinson
v. Ommanney, 21 Ch. D. 780 (1882). Where the promisor marries and has
issue subsequent to the making of a contract to will all his property, specific
performance will not be decreed as against his widow and children. Owens
v. McNally, 113 Cal. 444 (1896) ; Gall v. Gall, 64 Hun, 6oo (N. Y. 1892).
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-SALE OF LAND--The plaintiff agreed to sell a
tract of land to which at the time he did not have clear title, and the defendant agreed to buy it upon condition that the plaintiff could make good
title. When the plaintiff obtained good title to the land, he tendered it to the
defendant, who refused to accept. Held: As the plaintiff had good title when
he brought suit, he is entitled to specific performance. Heller v. McGuin,
1o4 N. E. Rep. 158 (Ill. 1914).
It is a general principle of specific performance that contracts to be
specifically enforced must be mutual; that is, that either of the parties, at the
time the contract is entered into, must be able to enforce the contract against
the other party. Fry, Sp. Pref. (3rd Ed.), 215. Thus a feme covert cannot
obtain a decree for specific performance of a contract which is not binding
upon her. Richards v. Green, 23 N. J. Eq. 536 (1873). Upon principle, therefore, it would seem that a vendor of real estate which he does not own at
the time of making the contract should not be allowed specific performance
for the reason that the vendee could not obtain specific performance against
him. This view has been followed in a few decisions: Luse v. Dietz, 46 Iowa,
2o5 (1877); Norris v. Fox, 45 Fed. Rep. 406 (1891); Ten Eyck v. Manning,
52 N. J. Eq. 47 (1893).
But the view supported by the great weight of
authority is in accord with the decision in the principal case-that the vendor
may have specific performance if he has good title when the decree is issued.

RECENT CASES
Dresel v. Jordan, 1O4 Mass. 407 (I87O) ; Maryland Construction C6. v. Kuper,
90 Md. 529 (igoo) ; Gibson v. Brown, 214 Ill. 330 (19o). See "Mutuality in
Specific Performance" by the tate Professor Ames, in 3 COLUu3IA LAW REv.
1 (1903).
STRIKES-PEACEFUL PIcKETnNG--During a strike an injunction was issued
to restrain the members of a moulders' union from interfering with the
employees or picketing the premises. An officer of the union stationed himself opposite to one of the entrances as the employees were going to work.
Three or four other members of the union stood about fifty feet or more
from him. Nothing was said to the workmen and no physical attempt at
interference was made. Held: That the union officer was guilty of a contempt for violating and disobeying the restraining order. In re Langdell,
z44 N. W. Rep. 841 (Mich. 1914).
The court here adopted the view that there is no such thing as peaceable picketing and consequently that all picketing is unlawful. In support
of this there are a number of authorities. Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass.
92 (1896); Beck v. Railway Teamsters' Union, II8 Mich. 497 (I898); Otis
Steel Co. v. Local Union, iio Fed. Rep. 698 (19O) ; Atchison, etc., Ry. Co. v.
Gee, 139 Fed. Rep. 582 (19o5). In the case last cited, Mr. Justice McPherson said: "There is and can be no such thing as peaceful picketing, any more
than there can be chaste vulgarity or peaceful mobbing or lawful lynching."
The true basis of liability is the use of force, threats of force or other
intimidation. The majority of courts hold that picketing may be unaccompanied by any of these objectionable elements, and that it is therefore not
unlawful per se. Kerbs v. Rosenstein, 67 N. Y. S.385 (igoo) ; Union P. R.
Co. v. Ruef, 12o Fed. Rep. 124 (19o2). If the design of the picketing is
merely to induce the workmen by quiet conversation and argument to leave
their employment, then it is not unlawful. Cumberland Glass Co. v. Blowers'
Ass'n, 59 N. J. Eq. 49 (I8g).
TORTS-FRAUDULENT

MISREPRESENTATIONS

IN THE

SALE

OF LANDS-The

plaintiff in this action for deceit was induced to exchange his land for land
owned by the defendant by misrepresentations of the defendant as to the
location of his land. The defendant falsely pointed out to the plaintiff as
the land to be conveyed other and more valuable land which in fact he did
not own. Held: The plaintiff has a right to rely on the representations made
by the defendant as to the location of the land conveyed. Shuttlefield v.
Neil, 145 N. W. Rep. (Ia. 1914).
The vendee of lands has a right to rely upon the representations of
his vendor respecting the quantity of land contained in the tract he is buying.
Griswold v. Gebbie, 126 Pa. 353 (x889) ; Ledbetter v. Davis, 121 Ind. 119
(1889) ; Canston v. Sturges, 29 Ore. 331 (1896). And false representations
as to the area of land, even though the true boundaries are pointed out are
actionable. Antle v. Sexton, 137 Ill. 41o (i891) ; May v. Loomis, 14o N. C.
350 (i9o5) ; McGlue v. Bell, 170 Mo. 121 (19o). But the Massachusetts
'courts hold that an action for deceit will not lie against one who, where
pointing out the true boundaries of the tract of land, fraudulently overstates
its area. Mabardy v. McHugh, 202 Mass. 148 (io9).
It is fraud if the vendor fraudulently points out a different and more
valuable property, as the one involved in the deal. Nelson v. Carlson, 54
Minn. 90 (z893) ; Lee v. Tarplin, 183 Mass. 52 (19o3). So are false representations as to the situation, character, or quality of the land when it is at a
distance. Horton v. Lee, io6 Wis. 439 (1900) ; Willey v. Clements, 146 Cal.
91 (igo5); or when the condition of the land does not admit of examination by the vendee. Knapp v. Schemmel, 124 N. W. Rep. 309 (Ia. 191o);
or if any artifice is used to prevent examination. Ladd v. Pigott, 114 Ill.
647 (1885) ; Brady v. Finn. 162 Mass. 260 (r894).
Where an action on the case for deceit is brought, the authorities are in
sharp conflict upon the question of damages. By the weight of authority the
measure of damages in an action for deceit in the exchange of property is
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the difference between the actual value of the property received and itb
value had it been as represented. Barbour v. Flick, 126 Cal. 628 (1899);
Haldeman v. Schuh, iog Ill. App. 259 (i9o3) ; Stoke v. Converse, 133 N. XV.
Rep. 70o (Ia. 1912). But a few courts refuse to apply this rule of damages and hold the measure of damages is the difference between the value
of the property parted with and that received. Rockefeller v. Merrett, 76 Fed.
Rep. gog (I896); George v. Hesse, ioo Tex. 44 (igo6); Page v. Johnston,
o5 Mass. 274 (19io).
TORTs-LIABILITY FOR WIFE'S TORTs-The husband was properly dismissed as a party defendant in an action for damages for the assault conimitted by his wife, for since the Enabling Acts have deprived the husband
of his control over and benefit from the property of his wife, and since
she can sue and be sued alone and judgments recovered in those suits will go
to her separate estate or are recoverable from her separate estate, there is no
longer any reason for holding the husband liable for her personal torts. Hageman v. Vanderdoes, 138 Pac. Rep. 1053 (Ariz. 1914).
There is a decided split of authorities as to the effect which Enabling
Acts have on the husband's liabilities for his wife's torts. Some of this difference of opinion is due to the different wording of particular statutes, but
under statutes substantially the same, irreconcilable results have been reached.
One line of cases in accord with the principal case applies the maxim that
the reason disappearing the rule of law will cease to operate, and that there
is no longer any consideration for the husband's liability for the wife's torts.
Martin v. Robson, 65 Ill. 129 (1872) ; Schuler v. Henry, 94 Pac. Rep. (Colo.
Strong reasons for relieving the husband of his liability for the
19o8).
torts of his wife are given in Harris v. Webster, 58 N. H. 481 (1878). Other
courts have held that since these statutes are in abrogation of the common law, they must be strictly construed and that they give no more rights
and relieve from no more liabilities than are particularly described in the
statute in question. Thus, to relieve the husband from liability for the torts
committed in the use of the separate estate of the wife is to hold him responsible for all other torts committed by the wife. Pett-Morgan v. KenIn
nedy, 63 Minn. 348 (I895); Henley v. Wilson, 137 Cal. 273 (1902).
Missouri, the married woman cannot be held alone for any tort, personal or
connected with the use of her separate estate. Flesh v. Lindsay, I15 Mo.
I (1892). Where the statutes did not refer to the husband's continued liability for torts of his, wife, distinction has been made between torts cornmitted in the use of separate property and personal torts, the husband remaining liable for the latter, but not for the former. Fitzgerald v. Quain,
zog N. Y. 44i (1888). By statute, the husband has been relieved from liability for any torts of his wife. Strubling v. Mahar, 46 App. Div. 409 (N. Y.
i89g). In Pennsylvania, it has been held that Married Women's Property
Acts do not relieve the husband from his liability for his wife's torts, and
if they are committed in his presence, he is alone liable. Hess v. Heft, 3
Pa. Super. Ct. 582 (1897). But the wife may be sued alone, and execution
cannot issue against the husband's property on a judgment against the wife.
Deardorff v. Pepper, 36 Pa. Super. Ct. 224 (Igo8). The wife is primarily
liable and the husband's property cannot be taken on a judgment for the
personal tort of the wife, until her property has been exhausted. Act of
April ii, I848, P. L. 536. In England, the wife may be sued alone or husband and wife jointly for personal torts committed by the wife after marriage. Earl v. Kingscote, L. R. 2 Ch. Div. 585 (Eng. I9oo).
TRADE NAMEs-GEoGRAPHICAL WoRl--The plaintiff company in 1893
adopted the name "Italian" to identify the silk underwear made by it and
not to show that the underwear-which was made of Japanese silk-was made
in Italy, of Italian silk or even by Italians. In the succeeding years a large
business was built up and the name, "Italian," acquired a secondary meaning. In I11, the defendant company began manufacturing underwear from
Japanese silk and called it "Italian silk underwear." Held: The plaintiff
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company had an exclusive right to the name "Italian" in connection with
silk underwear, and the defendant company was enjoined. Kayser & Co.
V. Italian Silk Underwear Co., 146 N. Y. Supp. 22 (1914).
As geographical names are common property which all may use, they
may not, as a general rule, become valid trademarks. Canal Co. v. Clark,
13 Wall. 311 (U. S. 1871) ; Cohen v. Nagle, i9o Mass. 4 (igo6): and therefore the subject of exclusive appropriation, Hygiea Water Co. v. Consolidated
139 (i9o6). They may. however, be protected against
Ice
Co.,competition
144 Fed. Rep.
Mont.
unfair
after they have acquired a "secondary meaning.'
gomery v. Thompson [i8g] A. C. 217 (Eng.); Elgin Watch Co. v. Illinois
Watch Co., 179 U. S. 665 (igoo) ; but the right to such protection is restricted
and relief is granted only so far as there is actual unfair competition. Briggs
v. National Water Co., IO2 N. E. Rep. 87 (Mass. 1913); see 62 U. OF P. L.
REV. 50 (Nov. 1913). Some cases, however, hold that exclusive trade mark
rights may be obtained in a geographical name by a resident of that locality
or for an article produced in that locality; Newman v. Alvord, 5I N. Y. 189
(1872); Clinton Metallic Paint Co. v. New York Paint Co., 5o N. Y .Supp.
437 (1898) ; though other cases deny the existence of this right on the ground
that in such cases there is enough evidence of unfair competition to warrant
equitable relief, whether or not there are trade mark rights. PillsburyWashburn Mills v. Eagle, 86 Fed. Rep. 6o8 (I898) ; California Ass'n v. Mayer,
io4 Fed. Rep. 82 (1899). But when the geographical name is used in a purely
arbitrary or fanciful sense, as in the principal case, it may be appropriated
as an exclusive trade mark. Fleischmann v. Schuckmann, 62 Hon. Pr. 92
(N. Y. x881) ; Walter Baker & Co. v. Baker. 77 Fed. Rep. 181 (1896) ; In re
Magnolia Metal Co's Trade Mark [1897] 2 Ch. 371 (Eng.). But see contra:
Apollo v. Perkins, 207 Fed. Rep. 530 (1913); 62 U. OF P. L. REV. 458 (Apr.
1914).
TRUSTS-RESULTING TRUST-SUBSEQUENT PAY.IENTs-A husband purchased real property. paying a portion of the consideration and contracting
to pay the balance. Title was conveyed to the wife. Held: Payments subsequent to the vesting of the legal title in the wife took effect by relation as
of the time title passed, and were admissible to rebut the presumption of a
gift to the wife and to establish a resulting trust for the husband. Yetmen v.
Hedgemen c! al., 88 At. Rep. 206 (N. J. 1913).
The general rule is that in order to create a resulting trust in favor of
one who pays the purchase money for property bought in the name of
another, the payment must be contemporaneous with the purchase. Bailey v.
Hemenway, 147 Mass. 326 (1888); McCormick v. Cooke, igg Pa. 631 (igoi).
The mere fact that the one taking title had in his hands money of the party
claiming the trust is not sufficient. Keith v. Miller, 174 Ill. 64, 51 N. E.
Rep. 151 (1898). Nor will an oral agreement to hold in trust be enforceable
by a subsequent tender of the purchase price. Ostheimer v. Single, 73 N. J.
But where it is clear that the money is
Eq. 539, 68 AtI. Rep. 231 (1907).
advanced and used in the purchase by the one taking the legal title, a trust
will result in favor of the one furnishing the money. Lounsbury v. Purdy,
16 Barb. 376 (N. Y. 1853) ; Gilchrist v. Brown, 165 Pa. 275, 30 At. Rep. 839
(1895). And what is equivalent to payment from one's own money will raise
a trust for the one so binding himself. Gray v. Jordan, 87 Me. 140 (i895) ;
Payments must be by way of purGaynor v. Quinn, 212 Pa. 362 (igo5).
chase and not as a loan. Whaley v. Whaley. 71 Ala. 159 (1881). So a loan
for improvements will not raise a resulting trust. Butterfield v. Butterfield,
79 Ark. 164, 95 S. W. Rep. 146 (19o6). And where a wife's money is used
but the title is conveyed to the husband, the presumption that it is a loan
must be rebutted. Cornman's Estate, 197 Pa. 125 (igoo) ; Byers v. Ferner,
216 Pa. 233 (1907).
It seems clear that, as in the principal case. the purchase of land under
an executory contract is sufficient to raise a resulting trust if part of the
price is paid or secured by the one claiming to be the beneficiary before the
passage of the legal title. Gilchrist v. Brown sitpra. Moore v. Mustoe, 47
West Va. 549. .35 S. E. Rep. 871 (i9oo); Lynch v. Herrig. 3a Mont. 267, 8o
Pac. Rep. 24o (9o5).

